# Message Text

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INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 IO-13 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-04 H-01 INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 DHA-02 EB-07 OMB-01 COME-00 TRSE-00 GSA-02 INT-05 /098 W

-----241935Z 025789 /44

P R 240735Z MAY 77
FM AMEMBASSY MAPUTO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5892
INFO AMEMBASSY LUSAKA
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
AMEMBASSY PRETORIA
AMCONSUL CAPE TOWN
AMEMBASSY GABORONE
AMEMBASSY LONDON

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E.O. 11652: GDS

USMISSION USUN NY

TAGS: PFOR, OVIP (YOUNG, ANDREW), US, MZ

SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR YOUNG MEETS WITH PRESIDENT MACHEL

1. SUMMARY: HOUR-LONG DISCUSSION WITH MACHEL FOCUSED ON ATTITUDES OF U.S. AND MOZAMBIQUE GOVERNMENTS TO DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA AND PROSPECTS FOR NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENTS. AMBASSADOR YOUNG EMPHASIZED COMMITMENT OF CARTER-MONDALE ADMINISTRATION TO CHANGE IN ZIMBABWE, NAMIBIA AND SOUTH AFRICA, BRIEFED MACHEL ON UPCOMING MONDALE-VORSTER TALKS, AND SOUGHT MACHEL'S SUPPORT FOR OUR INITIATIVES IN ZIMBABWE AND NAMIBIA. MACHEL SAID HE THOUGHT USG COULD MAKE A CONTRIBUTION TO RESOLUTION OF PROBLEMS IN AREA, BUT IS SKEPTICAL THAT LATEST UK/US NEGOTIATING EFFORTS WILL SUCCEED. HE BELIEVES DEEPLY THAT MUCH OF WHAT UK AND U.S. HAVE DONE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA IS COLORED BY RACISM.

MACHEL ASKED IF USG CONSIDERED LIBERATION STRUGGLE IN ZIMBABWE CONFIDENTIAL

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AND NAMIBIA TO BE JUST AND IF SO IF USG WERE PREPARED TO SUPPORT THE STRUGGLE, WHICH SEEMS FOR HIM TO BE TEST OF OUR BONAFIDES. MEETING GAVE LITTLE PROMISE THAT MACHEL WILL BE HELPFUL IN OUR NEGOTIATING INITIATIVES ALTHOUGH AT SAME TIME HIS ADDRESS TO CONFERENCE ON MAY 16 AND SUBSEQUENT ACTIONS OF HIS REPRESENTATIONS SUGGESTS THEY WILL NOT WORK OPENLY AGAINST OUR INITIATIVES. QUESTION OF IMPROVEMENT OF BILATERAL US-MOZAMBIQUE

RELATIONS DID NOT ARISE. END SUMMARY

- 2. AMBASSADOR YOUNG ALONG WITH DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY MOOSE AND AMBASSADOR DE PREE MET WITH MACHEL AFTERNOON OF MAY 17. MEETING WAS ONE IN A SERIES OF MEETINGS MACHEL IS HOLDING WITH SOME OF HEADS OF DELEGATIONS TO MAPUTO CONFERENCE. WHEREAS MOST OTHER MEETINGS WERE LIMITED TO 15 MINUTES, OUR MEETING LASTED AN HOUR. DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER PANGUENE AND CHIEF OF CABINET SERGIO VIEIRA WERE PRESENT.
- 3. FIRST TEN MINUTES WERE OPEN TO TV AND PRESS. DURING THIS SESSION MACHEL STRESSED THAT ZIMBABWE AND NAMIBIA WERE GLOBAL AS WELL AS REGIONAL PROBLEMS, THAT IT DUTY OF ALL COUNTRIES, INCLUDING U.S., TO SEEK SOLVE THESE PROBLEMS. HE WAS CAREFUL TO NOTE THAT HE WAS NOT NECESSARILY SAYING THAT USG HAD THE ANSWER, BUT THAT WE CAN MAKE A "GREAT CONTRIBUTION." HE THEREFORE WELCOMED AMBASSADOR YOUNG TO MAPUTO.
- 4. AMBASSADOR YOUNG STARTED OFF THE PRIVATE TALKS WITH DESCRIPTION OF CARTER ADMINISTRATION AND THE CHANGE THIS WILL NTAIL. HE STRESSED ADMINISTRATION'S DEEP COMMITMENT TO MAJORITY RULE, STEPS IT HAS ALREADY TAKEN OR IS ABOUT TO TAKE (MONDALE-VORSTER MEETING) IN PURSUIT OF THIS OBJECTIVE, AND ATTACHMENT OF PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT TO THE "LIBERAL TRADITION." YOUNG ALSO REVIEWED HIS EXPERIENCES WITH THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN U.S., POINTING UP IMPORTANT ROLE BUSINESS CAN PLAY IN BRINGING ABOUT CHANGE. YOUNG CONFESSED THAT HE IS NOT SURE SITUATION IN SOUTHERN U.S. IS RELEVANT TO SITUATION IN SOUTH AFRICA, BUT IF WE CAN NEGOCONFIDENTIAL

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TIATE A SMOOTH TRANSFER TO MAJORITY RULE IN ZIMBABWE AND NAMIBIA, IT MAY BE EASIER TO BRING ABOUT CHANGE IN SOUTH AFRICA. YOUNG CONCLUDED BY ASKING MACHEL'S SUPPORT IN OUR NEGOTIATING EFFORTS.

- 5. MACHEL ASKED WHAT WORRIED YOUNG MOST ABOUT ZIMBABWE. YOUNG NOTED TWO ITEMS: DISUNITY AMONG THE NATONALISTS AND THE CONSTRAINTS OPERATING ON UK WHICH PREVENT IT FROM PLAYING A MORE FORCEFUL ROLE. YOUNG REITERATED THAT USG WOULD WORK WITH WHATEVER NATIONALIST LEADER COMES OUT ON TOP, BUT IF THERE WERE A CIVIL WAR, U.S. COULD NOT HELP.
- 6. MACHEL FOLLOWED AMBASSADOR YOUNG'S PRSENTATION WITH A DISCUSSION OF MOZAMBIQUE'S EXPERIENCE WITH NEGOTIATIONS AND A REVIEW OF DEVELOPMENTS IN RHODESIA STARTING FROMFORMATION OF ZAPU TO UNILATERAL DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, THE CREATION OF ANC, AND NEGOTIATIONS WITH VORSTER AND SMITH. HE SAID THAT TWO ERRORS HAD BEEN MADE DURING THIS PERIOD. FIRST, THE NATIONALISTS USED THE ARMED STRUGGLE AS A MEANS OF BRINGING PRESSURE ON THE UK, WHEREAS IT SHOULD HAVE BEEN DIRECTED AGAINST SMITH.

SECOND, THE NATIONALISTS AND FRONT LINE STATES HAD BELIEVED THE "ENEMIES' WORDS." HE CITED THE 1974 EXPERIENCE WITH VORSTER AS A ASE IN POINT. "VORSTER SAID A CONSTITUTIONAL SETTLEMENT WAS POSSIBLE. WE BELIEVED HIM, BUT THOSE MAKING THE PROPOSALS DID NOT BELIEVE IN THEM" EVEN THOUGH VORSTER WITHDREW HIS TROOPS FROM RHODESIA, AND SMITH RELEASEDPOLITICAL PRISONERS, THESE WERE DECEPTIONS RATHER THAN FUNDAMENTAL CONCESSIONS. AT HEART SMITH AND VORSTER ARE NOT PREPARED TO ACCEPT MAJORITY RULE.

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### CAPE TOWN FOR EMBASSY

7. MACHEL CONDEMNED THE UK FOR NOT USING FORCE WHEN SMITH WAS WEAK, CONTENDING THAT THE BRITISH DID NOT USE FORCE BECAUSE OF RACE, NOT BECAUSE THEY WERE WEAK. HAD IT BEEN A BLACK REBELLION, THEY WOULD NOT HAVE HESITATED TO USE FORCE. EVEN TODAY, "NO ONE CAN CONVINCE ME THAT THE UK DOESN'T HAVE ENOUGH FORCE."

8. THE U.S. ALSO CAME IN FOR CRITICISM. "I THINK THE U.S. HAS A GREAT RESPONSIBILITY FOR WHAT IS HAPPENING IN RHODESIA." U.S. PURCHASES OF CHROME HELPED PUT A STAMP OF LEGALITY ON THE SMITH REGIME. THE U.S. HAS ALSO DECEIVED THE AFRICANS WHEN IT LED THEM INTO THINKING THAT IF THEY COOPERATED WITH THE U.S. AND UK IN THE GENEVA CONFERENCE, SMITH WOULD SOON BE REMOVED

FROM THE SCENE. ACCORDING TO MACHEL, IN 1975 PRIOR TO GENEVA, (ASSISTANT SECRETARY) SCHAUFELE SAID, "WE WOULT GIVE MAJORITY RULE," TO WHICH MACHEL HAD RESPONDED, "HOW ARE YOU GOING TO CONFIDENTIAL

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TAKE POWER FROM SMITH?" SCHAUFELE'S RESPONSE TO THIS ACCORDING TO MACHEL'S ACCOUNT WAS "SUPPORT US AND WE WILL DO IT." MACHEL NOTES THAT, OF COURSE, SMITH IS STILL ON THE SCENE. YET WHEN THE GENEVA CONFERENCE BROKE DOWN, THE WEST WAS QUICK TO CHARGE THAT THE BREAKDOWN WAS CAUSED BY NATIONALIST INTRANSIGENCE, WHEREAS THE REAL REASON WAS SMITH. "THE U.S. AND THE UK OOKED FOR DIVISIONS AMONG THE NATIONALISTS - AND YOU FOUND THEM," MACHEL ADDED. "AT THE TIME OF GENEVA WE CONSIDERED THE U.S. AND THE UK AS ALLIES WITH US." JUDGING BY OUR PERFORMANCE AT GENEVA HE SAID WE APPEARED TO BE ON THE SIDE OF SMITH.

9. MACHEL INDICATED THAT HE IS NOT SURE WHERE PRESIDENT CARTER STANDS. AFTER YOUNG TRIED TO REASSURE MACHEL THAT CARTER AND MONDALE INDEED DO UNDERSTAND RACISM AND ARE DEEPLY CONCERNED ABOUT WHAT IS HAPPENING IN SOUTHERN AFRICA, MACHEL POSED, QUITE FORCEFULLY, A PAIR OF QUESTIONS WHICH TO HIM MAY BE THE TEST OF WHERE WE STAND ON SOUTHERN AFRICA: "DO YOU CONSIDER THE LIBERATION STRUGGLE IN ZIMBABWE AND NAMIBIA TO BE JUST? AND, "WOULD THE U.S. GIVE HELP TO THE LIBERATION MOVEMENTS?" AMBASSADOR DE PREE NOTED THAT IN EARLIER CONVERSATIONS, THE PRESIDENT HAD SAID THAT THE OBJECTIVE OF MAJORITY RULE AND FREEDOM COULD BE FURTHERED IN SEVERAL WAYS: THROUGH THE ARMED STRUGGLE. THE APPLICATION OF SANCTIONS, AND DIPLOMACY. EVEN THOUGH THE U.S. COULD NOT SUPPORT THE ARMED STRUGGLE. WE COULD CONTRIBUTE TO THE RESOLUTION OF SOUTHERN AFRICA PROBLEMS THROUGH THE TOTAL APPLICA-TION OF SANCTIONS, AND THROUGH PURSUIT OF A NEGOTIATED SETTLE-MENT. THIS LINE OF ARGUMENT DID NOT SEEM TO IMPRESSMACHEL.

10. TURNING TO NAMIBIA, MACHEL NOTED WESTERN UNWILLINGNESS TO BACK SWAPO AS THE SOLE AND AUTHENTIC REPRESENTATIVE OF THE NAMIBIAN PEOPLE. HE FEARED WE MIGHT BACK A PUPPET PARTY, WHICH HE CHARGED US OF DOING IN VIETNAM. HE WARNED THAT IF WE SUPPORTED A "PUPPET," RACIAL WAR WOULD INEVITABLY RESULT.

1. MACHEL CONCLUDED BY STRESSING THAT THE WAR AGAINST COLONIALISM IS NOT A RACIAL WAR. IT IS A LIBERATION WAR. THERE ARE BLACK AS CONFIDENTIAL

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WELL AS WITE COLONIALISTS AGAINST WHOM WE ARE FIGHTING. "A RACIAL WAR," HE SAID, "DOES NOT DESERVE OUR SUPPORT." AS WAS TRUE IN FRELIMO'S STRUGGLE, THE ENEMIES ARE NOT THE WHITES, BUT THE

#### COLONIALIST, MACHEL SAID.

12. COMMENT: MACHEL IS SINGLE-MINDED AND TOUGH. PROJECTIONS FROM HIS OWN EXPERIENCS SEEM CONTROLLING IN HIS APPROACH TO ZIMBABWE: THE HATRED OF COLONIALISM; HIS BELIEF THAT RACISM DOMINATES U.S. AND UK VIEWS; AND HIS BELIEF IN THE PERFIDY OF THE WEST AND HIS FAITH IN THE EFFICACY OF ARMED STRUGGLE AS A UNIFYING AND LIBERATING FORCE. WHILE HE CAME DOWN HARD ON AMBASSADOR YOUNG AT KEY POINTS IN THE CONVERSATION, MACHEL ALSO SEEMED GENUINELY INTERESTED IN HIS VISITOR AND WAS OUTWARDLY WARM IN HIS PERSONAL MANNER. GIVEN MACHEL'S SCHEDULE AND THE HOUR, THE AMOUNT OF TIME SPENT WITH YOUNG WAS UNSUAAL. DE PREE

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## Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X

Capture Date: 01-Jan-1994 12:00:00 am Channel Indicators: n/a

**Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED** Concepts: POLITICAL SETTLEMENT, DIPLOMATIC DISCUSSIONS

Control Number: n/a

Copy: SINGLE Sent Date: 24-May-1977 12:00:00 am Decaption Date: 01-Jan-1960 12:00:00 am

Decaption Note:

Disposition Action: RELEASED Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW

Disposition Date: 22 May 2009 Disposition Event:

Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1977MAPUTO00683
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00

**Document Unique ID: 00** 

Drafter: n/a Enclosure: n/a Executive Order: GS

Errors: N/A **Expiration:** 

Film Number: D770185-0299

Format: TEL From: MAPUTO

Handling Restrictions: n/a

Image Path:

ISecure: 1

Legacy Key: link1977/newtext/t19770524/aaaaauoq.tel

Line Count: 237 Litigation Code IDs: Litigation Codes:

Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: 2dbd568b-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc

Office: ACTION AF

Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a

Page Count: 5
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a

Reference: n/a Retention: 0

Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED Review Content Flags: Review Date: 08-Feb-2005 12:00:00 am

Review Event:

Review Exemptions: n/a **Review Media Identifier:** Review Release Date: n/a Review Release Event: n/a **Review Transfer Date:** Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a

SAS ID: 2392763 Secure: OPEN Status: NATIVE

Subject: AMBASSADOR YOUNG MEETS WITH PRESIDENT MACHEL

TAGS: PFOR, OVIP, PDIP, US, MZ, (YOUNG, ANDREW), (MACHEL, SAMORA)

To: STATE Type: TE

vdkvgwkey: odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS\_Docs/2dbd568b-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc

Review Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009

Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009